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STOIC PSYCHOTHERAPY IN 
DESCARTES AND SPINOZA1 
Derk Pereboom 
The psychotherapeutic theories of Descartes and Spinoza are heavily influ-
enced by Stoicism. Stoic psychotherapy has two central features. First, we 
have a remarkable degree of voluntary control over our passions, and we can 
and should exercise this control to keep ourselves from having any irrational 
passiom: at all. Second, the universe is determined by the providential divine 
will, and in any situation we can and should align ourselves with this divine 
will in order to achieve equanimity. Whereas Descartes largely endorses the 
Stoic picture, Spinoza develops a distinctive, intellectualized version of this 
view. 
Although the influence of the Stoic outlook on sixteenth and seventeenth 
century European culture has been well-documented, it is seldom recalled 
how, in particular, Stoicism affects the views of the early modern European 
philosophers.2 The works of Descartes and Spinoza supply remarkable illus-
trations of this impact. Some of the most interesting of these Stoic infl uences 
can be found in their writings on therapy for the passions. Both Descartes 
and Spinoza ground their discussions in the psychotherapeutic theory of the 
Stoics, and their final views bear the imprint of the Stoic model, although in 
different respects. 
The Stoic theory embraces two controversial claims, each of which gives 
rise to a therapeutic strategy. The first claim is that we have much more 
voluntary control over our actions and passions than one might ordinarily 
suppose, and the associated therapeutic strategy advises that we exercise this 
control as a. means to well-being. The second claim is that the universe is 
wholly determined by the providential divine will, which is identical with the 
laws of nature, and the correlated therapeutic proposal recommends that we 
align our concerns with God's so that we will achieve equanimity even in the 
most trying of circumstances. Descartes advocates each of these controversial 
claims and the associated therapeutic strategies. But although Spinoza accepts 
the Stoics' belief about divine determinism, he rejects their understanding of 
our voluntary control over the actions and passions. Nevertheless, Spinoza 
attempts to preserve some of the key intuitions behind each of the two thera-
peutic strategies, and in this endeavor provides an inventive rethinking of the 
Stoic conception. 
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I 
A thorough and persuasive account of the first claim is presented by Brad 
Inwood in his Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. 3 According to the 
Stoic theory, human action has three main stages. In the first, the possibility 
of an action is presented to the agent. For example, the possibility of eating 
a piece of pie might be presented to you by your seeing it on the kitchen 
table. This stage is called phantasia, presentation or impression. Correspond-
ing to a phantasia is a lekton, a proposition or sayable, for example, it is 
fitting for me to eat that piece of pie, which the agent entertains but does not 
necessarily endorse when she has a phantasia. 
In the second stage, synkatathesis, assent, comes into play. A mature human 
agent normally has the power freely and voluntarily to assent to, dissent from, 
or suspend judgment with regard to the lekton corresponding to a phantasia. 
(In the Stoic view, this power is not possessed by animals or by young 
children.4) Its source is the rational, ruling, part of the soul - the 
hegemonikon. (The other parts of the soul are the five senses, the linguistic 
part, and the reproductive part). When an agent dissents or suspends judgment 
with regard to the initiallekton, the development of an action ceases. But if 
the agent assents, the third stage, horme, impulse, results. According to Clean-
thes and Chrysippus, the mind is made up a pneuma, a composite of air and 
fire, and horme (which means setting in motion) is a forceful motion of this 
substance that results from assent to a lekton as presented by a phantasia.5 
Horme is a psychological (as opposed to physical) component of an action; 
for instance, the setting of oneself to eat the piece of pie is a horme. Parallel 
to (and quite clearly causing) the horme is a self-directed judgment, which 
results from assenting to the lekton corresponding to the phantasia. In our 
example, the judgment would be 'Yes, it is fitting for me to eat that piece of 
pie,' and if Inwood is right, the horme is also linked with an imperative like 
'Eat that piece of pie!,6 
The Stoics' theory of action is, in part, a subspecies of their theory of 
judgment. In general, judgment results from the agent's exercise of its power 
of assent on the occasion of a phantasia. According to Chrysippus, the (nor-
mal) function of a phantasia is to "reveal itself and its cause" to its recipient, 
and hence "the word 'phantasia' is derived from 'phos,' [light]; just as light 
reveals itself and whatever else it includes in its range, so phantasia reveals 
itself and its cause."7 Nevertheless, there are both accurate and misleading 
phantasiai, which the Stoics called kataleptike (literally, capable of grasping 
(its object» and akataleptos: 8 
The cataleptic. which they say is the criterion of things, is that which arises 
from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what 
is. The acataleptic is either that which does not arise from what is, or from 
that which is but is not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not 
clear and distinct (me trane mede ektupon).9 
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A wise person (sophos) would refuse assent upon entertaining an acataleptic 
phantasia, and would grant assent only to the cataleptic sorC 10 In the Stoic 
view, what is distinctive about a phantasia that functions as a component of 
action is that it reveals to the agent something that might motivate her, for 
example, something that would contribute to her health or well-being. Such 
a phantasia potentially gives rise to horme, and hence it is called phantasia 
hormetike (hormetic presentation). 11 A wise person would refuse assent upon 
considering a hormetic presentation when, for example, the result would be 
an action not directed towards the good. 
A prominent feature of the Stoic picture is that passions (given a certain 
specific conception of a passion) are a type of horme, and hence fit into the 
theory in just the way horme does. 12 Thus for an agent to experience a passion, 
she must first have an appropriate phantasia. She must then assent to a lekton 
as presented by the phantasia, perhaps to a lekton such as 'it is fitting for me 
to fear my reputation being ruined by the media.' From assent to such a lekton 
a horme of a special type results, one which is identical with the passion. In 
the Stoic conception, therefore, passions do not happen to an agent. Rather, 
whenever an agent has a passion, it has in a sense been chosen by that agent. 
And accordingly, an agent can avoid struggling against passions altogether, 
because simply by exercising her power of assent, she can prevent any unto-
ward passion from coming to exist at all. 13 
In the chapter on Zeno of Citium in his Lives o/the Philosophers, Diogenes 
Laertius recounts the Stoic classification of the passions. 14 In the classical 
Stoic view, the word 'pathos,' (which is standardly but often misleadingly 
translated as 'passion,') always denotes a state to be avoided, a state upon 
whose presentation (phantasia) one must never assent. Citing treatises by 
Zeno and Recato,15 both entitled Peri Pathon, Diogenes observes that for the 
Stoics there are four great classes of the pathe: craving (epithumia), fear 
(Phobos), pleasure (hedone), and distress (lupe). Each of these types of pathos 
is irrational (alogos). Craving is irrational appetite (alogos orexis), fear is 
irrational avoidance (alogos ekklisis), pleasure is irrational elation or expan-
sion (a logos eparsis), and grief or distress is irrational contraction (alogos 
susto!e). Craving and fear are irrational attitudes towards what one thinks to 
be good and bad respectively, while pleasure and distress are irrational atti-
tudes towards getting and failing to get what one wants. 16 
Diogenes Laertuis reports that the Stoics also maintain that there are three 
classes of "good passions" (eupatheia, which are not pathe, by the classical 
Stoic characterization); joy (chara), caution or watchfulness (eulabeia), and 
will or wishing (boulesis).17 Joy is rational elation (eulogos eparsis), and thus 
corresponds to pleasure, caution is rational avoidance (eulogos ekklisis) and 
is the counterpart to fear, while will as opposed to craving is rational appetite 
(eulogos orexis). (The Stoic classification includes no rational counterpart to 
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grief or pain - perhaps they think that mental contraction is never rational.) 
In certain circumstances the eupatheiai are appropriately experienced. Joy, 
for example, is fitting when one contemplates an excellence that one has 
achieved: 
What then is your own? The use of external presentations (chresis phanta-
sian). Therefore, when you are in harmony with nature in the use of external 
presentations, then be elated; for then it will be some good of your own at 
which you will be elated. (Epictetus, Encheiridion 6) 
Hence, joy is appropriate when one's employment of one's power of assent 
towards external presentations is in harmony with nature (kata phusin).18 
Chrysippus characterizes the pathe as contrary to nature and thereby irra-
tional. 19 But why are they irrational in this sense? Diogenes attributes to Zeno 
the claim that the pathe are to be avoided because they are impulses in excess 
(horme pleonazousa). By Chrysippus' analogy (reported by Galen), a pathos 
is like running as opposed to walking. When one runs, one cannot stop 
precisely when one wants to; similarly, once one has a pathos, one cannot 
cease having it just by wanting to.20 But a pathos' resistance to voluntary 
control is not precisely what makes it bad for an agent. Rather, a pathos is 
harmful because of its resistance to voluntary control under the guidance of 
reason, and further, its tendency to impair one's more general ability to exercise 
rational voluntary controlY A fragment from Stobaeus illustrates this view: 
'Irrational' and 'contrary to nature' are not used in their ordinary senses: 
'irrational' is equivalent to 'disobedient to reason.' Every pathos is overpow-
ering, since people in states of pathos frequently see that it is not suitable to 
do this but are carried away by the intensity, as though by a disobedient horse, 
and are induced to do it... The sense of 'contrary to nature' in the outline 
account of pathos is of something that happens contrary to the right and 
natural reason. Everyone in states of pathos turns aside from reason, but not 
like those who have been deceived in something or other, but in a special 
way. For when people have been deceived, for instance over atoms being first 
principles, they give up the judgment, once they have been taught that it is 
not true. But when people are in states of pathos, even if they realize or are 
taught to realize that one should not feel distress or fear or have their soul, 
quite generally, in states of pathos, they still do not give these up, but are 
brought by them to a position of being controlled by their tyranny. (LS I 411) 
Even if one's reason would proscribe the pathos that one presently has, the 
pathos will nevertheless resist and overpower one's capacity for rational 
voluntary control, and one would therefore persist in the pathos despite the 
counsel of reason. Consequently, the wise person never assents to a lekton as 
presented by a phantasia of a pathos, and is accordingly patheless (apathe). 
Inwood illuminates the Stoic theory of the pathe by a fragment from 
Epictetus: 
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Presentations in the mind ... with which the intellect of man is struck as soon 
as the appearance of something which happens reaches the mind are not 
voluntary or subject to one's control; but by a force of their own they press 
themselves on men to be acknowledged. But the assents ... by which the same 
presentations are acknowledged are voluntary and are subject to human con-
trol. Therefore, when some frightening sound from the sky or a collapsing 
building or the sudden announcement of some danger, or something else of 
the sort occurs, it is inevitable that even the sage's soul be moved for a short 
while and be contracted and grow pale, not because he has formed an opinion 
of anything evil but because of certain rapid and unreflective movements 
which forestall the proper function of intellect and reason. Soon, though, the 
sage in question does not give assent... to such presentations ... but rejects 
and refuses them and judges that there is nothing in them to be feared. 22 
In the Stoic conception, mere perception of the threat of a dangerous event 
is causally insufficient to produce the pathos of fear. Rather, the occurrence 
of the pathos of fear requires that the threatening event cause in the agent a 
phantasia of the pathos, and that he freely assent to a [ekton as presented by 
this phantasia. The wise person will always refuse to assent upon a presen-
tation of a pathos, although such a presentation may initially jar his capacity 
for reasoning. 
The fragment from Epictetus helps us correct several often-misunderstood 
features the Stoic theory of the passions. First, a phantasia that introduces a 
pathos does not leave the agent motivationally unaffected. Rather, a presen-
tation of this sort gives rise to an interest in the agent, and this is the force 
of classifying it as phantasia hormetike. Furthermore, given our terminology, 
we might classify such a presentation as a passion. When I discover that 
someone has deliberately undermined my interests, we might classify my 
involuntary emotional response as the passion of anger. One cannot tell 
whether the Stoics would agree with this categorization, since they have no 
term corresponding to our word 'passion.' The distinctive claim of the Stoics 
is that an emotional state that seriously impairs one's capacity for voluntary 
rational control - a pathos - cannot occur unless one voluntarily assents 
to a lekton as presented by a phantasia that introduces such a state. In addi-
tion, they maintain the optimistic view that since a phantasia of this sort 
occurs involuntarily, it cannot by itself seriously impair one's capacity for 
voluntary rational control, and that by exercising one's power voluntarily to 
refuse assent., one can avoid altogether states that hinder reason in this way. 
The second therapeutic strategy flows from the Stoics' deterministic view 
of the universe; "Chrysippus says that fate is a certain everlasting ordering 
of the whole; one set of things follows on and succeeds another, and the 
interconnection is inviolable."23 Both Zeno and Chrysippus maintain that all 
things are determined by God (Zeus) who is identical to reason (logos), 
providence (pronoia), and nature (Phusis). God is a physical substance, ap-
parently identical either to pneuma, a combination of air and fire, or just to 
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fire, which is in everything as its principle of order and design: 
The Stoics made God out to be intelligent, a designing fire which methodi-
cally proceeds toward creation of the world, and encompasses all the seminal 
principles according to which everything comes about according to fate, and 
a breath (pneuma) pervading the whole world, which takes on different names 
owing to the ~erations of the matter through which it passes.24 
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Chrysippus is willing to speak of many gods; for example, in his view Nep-
tune is the air which diffuses itself through the sea. But at the time of the 
periodic conflagration (ekpurosis) in a Great Year, all the gods are destroyed 
except Zeus. 25 Furthermore, according to Chrysippus the gods are providen-
tial, since they are beneficial and friendly toward human beings, and they 
"made us for our own sake and for each other, and the animals for our sake."26 
Hence, Zeus determines the universe in a manner that is providential for 
human beings (at least for human beings generally considered, yet apparently 
not in a way that aims at the good of each individual human being.) 
In the Stoic conception, one should accommodate oneself to the determi-
nism of the universe by, as Epictetus puts it, seeking to have things happen 
as they do happen (Encheiridion 8). One should do so even if what happens 
might be bad from one's personal point of view, that is, from the perspective 
of one's ordinary human aspirations for personal survival, happiness, and 
success. The Stoic recommendation is that one should cease to appraise the 
events of one's life from one's personal point of view, and to evaluate them 
instead from the divine perspective. That is, one should appraise the events 
of one's life solely by the purposes God has in creating and preserving the 
universe, aims which are distinct from, and may conflict with, one's ordinary 
personal concerns. 
This abstracted stance towards one's life is expressed in the Stoic concep-
tion of reservation (hupexairesis, literally 'exception').27 In our universe, 
much is not within our control, and thus we may find ourselves rationally 
aiming to achieve ends we are not certain to obtain. This sort of difficulty 
might result either from our lack of power or from our lack of knowledge. If 
a someone aspires to become president, he may not have the capability to 
achieve his end, and further, even if he will in fact succeed, he will likely 
not come to know this when he forms his intent. One strategy for handling 
this type of difficulty is to avoid striving for anything one cannot be assured 
of acquiring. But the Stoics do not encourage this approach. Rather, they 
enjoin acting with reservation. 
Whenever one acts, one does so by assenting to a lekton as presetned by 
the phantasia of the action. If one is to act in accordance with the will of 
God, the judgments one makes as a result of assenting must conform to this 
will. Thus if one aims to set sail tomorrow, one should not simply resolve to 
set sail tomorrow, but as Seneca advises in On Tranquility, to say "I will set 
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sail tomorrow unless something intervenes," or "if it is so fated." In the 
explicitly theological formulation one would resolve "I will set sail tomorrow 
unless it goes against the will of God." If the judgment that results from one's 
assent includes a clause such as 'unless it goes against the will of God,' a 
reserved impulse will ensue.28 Accordingly, the propositional aspect of acting 
with reservation is matched by a type of mental state. At this level, reservation 
involves a degree of psychological detachment from any outcome that is not 
up to us. As a result of this detachment we will not be (as) distressed if an 
attempt to achieve some end fails. In Seneca's view, "the suffering that comes 
to the mind from the abandonment of desire must necessarily be much lighter 
if you have not certainly promised it success." 
More fundamentally, reservation involves assuming the divine perspective 
on our successes and failures. It ultimately requires that we evaluate the 
outcomes of our ventures from the point of view of God's purposes. If we 
supplement this stance with the belief that everything that happens is provi-
dentially ordained by God, perhaps we will be able to accept the result of 
any endeavor with equanimity, and even to regard any outcome with joy. 
Marcus Aurelius recommends an outlook of this sort: 
You must consider the doing and perfecting of what the universal Nature (te 
koine physei) decrees in the same light as your health, and welcome all that 
happens, even if it seems harsh, because it leads to the health of the universe 
(ten tou kosmou hygieian), and the welfare and well-being of Zeus. For he 
would not have allotted this to anyone if it were not beneficial to the Whole 
(ei me toi holM sunepheren). (Meditations V, 8) 
If we align our desires with the good of the Whole, we will welcome anything 
that happens to us, even our own impending death, for "cessation of life is 
no evil to the individual, since ' .. it is good if it is timely for the Whole, 
bringing benefit to it, and benefitted by it" (Meditations XII, 23).29 
These two Stoic approaches to therapy for the passions, one which affirms 
the power of assent, and the other divine determinism, might be thought 
incompatible, and the early Stoics attempted to respond to this sort of chal-
lenge. Chrysippus holds that despite universal divine determinism, assent is 
voluntary and free. This is possible because events can be determined to occur 
in accordance with our free voluntary control: "we contribute much assiduous 
and zealous effort with respect to these things because it has been ordained 
that they occur in conjunction with our wills."30 Although upon considering 
a presentation we have the capacity to assent, dissent, or suspend judgment, 
yet whatever our decision turns out to be, it has been determined by God. As 
we shall see, Spinoza's rejection of Stoic compatibilism is part of his moti-
vation to disavow the power of assent and the associated form of therapy, 
while Descartes' endorsement of this position is an issue in his correspon-
dence with Elizabeth, to which we now turn. 
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II 
In 1645 Descartes learns that Princess Elisabeth, with whom he has already 
enjoyed a rewarding correspondence, has been ill with a fever for three or 
four weeks. He diagnoses the cause of her ailment as sadness and anger, 
whereupon he advises: 
you would be unable to be delivered from all these things, unless, by the 
force of your virtue, you render your soul content, despite the disgraces of 
fortune. (AT IV 201lB119). 
A few months later, Descartes proposes that his future correspondence benefit 
"from the reading of a certain book, namely, from the book Seneca has written 
concerning the blessed life ... " (to Elisabeth, 21 July, 1645, AT IV 252-
3/B 131). That same year Descartes also begins work on The Passions of the 
Soul, published in 1649, in which he revises and develops the views he 
discusses with Elisabeth. 
The form of therapy Descartes advocates in these writings is clearly Stoi-
calY In the following excerpt from the letter to Elisabeth of October 6, 1645, 
the important distinctions correspond to those of the Stoics: 
(A) Also we sometimes confuse inclinations (inclinations) or habits (habi-
tudes) that dispose one to some passion with the passion itself, but neverthe-
less they can easily be distinguished from the passion. For example, when 
one announces to a city that enemies are coming to besiege it, the first 
judgment (jugement) the inhabitants make concerning the evil that can hap-
pen to them is an action of their soul (action de leur arne), not a passion. 
And though this judgment is similarly found in many people. they are nev-
ertheless not equally moved; rather. some are moved more and others less. 
according as they possess a greater or lesser habit or inclination towards fear. 
And before their soul receives the excitation (emotion) in which alone the 
passion consists, it is necessary that she make this judgment; or else, without 
judging, that she at least conceive the danger and imprint the image of it upon 
the brain (which happens by a different action called "to imagine") ... (AT IV 
312ffl161) 
This passage reflects several central elements of the Stoic theory of the 
passions. The judgments the inhabitants of the city make concerning the evil 
that might occur, which are actions and precede the passions, seem akin to 
the judgments that result from assent to lekta that introduce passions. And 
the claim that a passion such as fear comes about as a result of such a 
judgment is clearly Stoical. Moreover, according to Descartes' Fourth Medi-
tation account, a judgment is formed by the will's assenting to a preliminary 
representation, just as the Stoics affirmed (AT VII, 52-62). This view is 
repeated in the Principles: 
In order to make a judgement, the intellect is of course required since, in the 
case of something which we do not in any way perceive, there is no judge-
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ment we can make. But the will is also required so that, once something is 
perceived in some manner, our assent may then be given (Principles I 34/AT 
VIllA 18). 
We can infer that the judgments Descartes refers to in the letter to Elisabeth 
also have this structure, and thus, that a judgement that results in a passion 
is preceded by a representation to which the agent voluntarily assents. 
Significantly, however, he does allow that a passion might occur without 
judgment, as long as the soul "conceive the danger and imprint the image of 
it upon the brain." In Inwood's interpretation of classical Stoicism, the patke, 
by their very conception, can occur only as a result of judgment. The Stoics 
do maintain, however, that in animals and in young children states analogous 
to patke occur without assent and judgment, and they call the process by 
which an action or pathos-analogue occurs without assent yielding (eixis). 32 
Descartes could be allowing that passions might also come about without 
judgment in adult human beings, but the excerpt does not specify the circum-
stances under which this can happen. As we shall see, however, a departure 
from the classical Stoic view along these lines is more definite in The Pas-
sions of the Soul. 
An earlier passage in this same letter might initially appear to conflict with 
the Stoic theory: 
.. .in man [impressions are formed] by the action of the soul, which has the 
force to change the impressions in the brain as, reciprocally, these impres-
sions have the force to excite in her the thoughts that do not depend upon 
her will. In consequence of this, one can generally name 'passions' all the 
thoughts that are thus excited (qui sont ainsi excities) in the soul without the 
concurrence of her will (sans Ie concours de La volonte), and consequently, 
solely by the impressions in the brain, and without any action that proceeds 
from her - for everything that is not an action is a passion. (AT IV 31 OIB 160) 
Nevertheless, there is really no disagreement with Stoicism here. Descartes 
might at first seem to be saying that a passion, by its very definition, cannot 
result from an act of will. Such an initial impression would be mistaken. 
Descartes' claim is rather that a passion is never the immediate effect of the 
will, but always an immediate effect of impressions in the brain, and thus, in 
his terminology, passions are excited without the concurrence of the will. 
Actions, by contrast, are immediate effects of the will, and thus occur "with 
the concurrence of the will." But actions, of which judgments are a subspe-
cies, can generate passions by causing impressions in the brain which in turn 
cause thoughts that do not depend on the will. And thus, in Descartes' view, 
the will can mediately cause passions. He provides an illustration of such a 
process in the passage that immediately follows (A) above: 
... and it is also necessary that, by the same means [i.e. judgment or imagina-
tion] the soul determines the spirits (esprits) that travel from the brain by the 
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nerves into the muscles to enter those muscles that serve to close the openings 
of the heart, thus retarding the circulation of the blood; in consequence, all 
the body becomes pale, cold, and trembling, and the new spirits, which come 
from the heart to the brain, are agitated in such a manner that they can assist 
in forming there those images that excite in the soul the passion of fear -
all of which events so closely follow each other that it seems but a single 
operation. (AT IV 3l2-3/BI61-2) 
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For the passion of fear to arise, the soul must determine the spirits in the 
brain either by judgment or by imagination. Thereupon the spirits cause a 
physiological change in the body, which causes new spirits that travel to the 
brain to be agitated and thereby to assist in forming images that excite the 
passion of fear in the soul. 
It is noteworthy that the term 'esprits' is derived from 'spiritus,' the Latin 
equivalent of 'pneuma.' Descartes' view accordingly mirrors the classical 
Stoic conception insofar as he maintains that a passion occurs when a judg-
ment causes a movement in the spirits. For Chrysippus, however, passions, 
and the judgments that cause them, are actually states of the pneuma, of which 
the mind is wholly constituted. For Descartes, by contrast, passions are states 
of the immaterial soul, as are the judgments that often occasion them, and 
the spirits merely playa causal role in the production of the passions. 
In the Elisabeth correspondence Descartes also endorses the central pre-
scriptive component of the Stoic theory: 
... all our passions represent the goods to whose pursuit they incite us as very 
much greater than they are; and also, that the pleasures of the body are never 
so durable as those of the soul, nor so great when one possesses them as they 
might appear when one looks forward to them. We must pay careful attention 
to this, so that when we feel ourselves moved by some passion, we may 
suspend our judgment (nous suspendions notre Jugement) until the passion 
is calmed, and so that we do not easily allow ourselves to be deceived by the 
false appearances of the goods of the world. (to Elisabeth, IS September 
164S, AT IV 294-S/BlS3) 
Descartes advocates suspending judgment when one is moved by a passion 
of a certain sort, and his claim would be altogether Stoical had he not affirmed 
that "we may suspend judgment until the passion is calmed." There are two 
ways to reconcile this assertion with the Stoic view. The first is to interpret 
'passion' as it occurs here as 'presentation that introduces a passion,' or, as 
the Stoics sometimes referred to such presentations, as 'preliminary passion' 
(propatheia).33 The second is by reading Descartes as extending the Stoic 
view to a strategy one might adopt once one is already beset by a debilitating 
passion. Supposing that the judgment that causes the passion is still in place 
after the passion has developed, Descartes could be recommending that when 
one is plagued by a harmful passion, one should withdraw one's assent by 
suspending one's judgment, because this procedure will allow the passion to 
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subside. In the context of Descartes' correspondence, this interpretation is 
plausible, since he believes that Elisabeth is already troubled by the passions 
of sadness and anger, and that she therefore needs a way to eliminate them, 
and not a method to keep them from arising. 
Descartes amplifies several aspects of this theory in his later work, The 
Passions of the Soul. In Part I we find a passage that might again initially 
seem anti-Stoical: 
Our passions cannot likewise be directly excited (excitees) or removed 
(os tees) by the action of our will, but they can be indirectly by the repre-
sentation of things which are usually joined to the passions we will to have 
and opposed to the ones we will to reject. Thus, in order to excite boldness 
and remove fear in oneself, it is not sufficient to have the volition to do so 
- one must apply oneself to attend to reasons, objects, or precedents that 
convince [one] that the peril is not great, that there is always more security 
in defence than in flight, that we will have glory and joy from having con-
quered, whereas one can expect only regret and shame for having fled, and 
similar things (I 45/AT XI 362-3N43). 
As a result, one may "easily overcome the lesser passions, but not the most 
vigorous and the strongest, until after the excitation of the blood and spirits 
has abated" (I 46/AT IX 3641V44). What might at first appear to conflict with 
the Stoic conception is Descartes' assertion that our passions cannot be di-
rectly excited or removed by the action of the will. He means to argue that 
the will cannot excite or remove a passion simply by willing that it be excited 
or removed. 34 The Stoics, however, do not claim that a pathos can be directly 
excited by the will in the sense that Descartes intends, since they believe that 
for a pathos to come about, a presentation of the pathos must first occur. 
Hence, they might agree with Descartes that passions can only be indirectly 
excited "by the representation of things which are usually joined to the pas-
sions we will to have," that is, by entertaining or imagining presentations. 
Furthermore, the Stoics also do not maintain that a pathos, once it has come 
to exist, can be directly removed by the action of the will. Our inability to 
remove a pathos directly by the power of assent is one of their primary 
reasons for recommending their avoidance, as Chrysippus' analogy to walk-
ing and running suggests. This conception is reflected in Descartes' view that 
... there is one particular reason why the soul cannot readily alter or check its 
passions, which has led me to put in their definition above that they are not 
only caused but are also maintained and strengthened by some particular 
movement of the spirits. This reason is that they are almost all accompanied 
by some excitation taking place in the heart, and consequently also through-
out the blood and the spirits, so that until this excitation has ceased they 
remain present to our thought, in the same way as objects capable of being 
sensed are present to it while they are acting upon our sense organs. (I 46/AT 
XI363/v44) 
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Thus Descartes' claims do not conflict with the Stoic theory. 
The Passions of the Soul reflects a more mature view about the power the 
will has to prevent a passion: 
It is also useful to know that although the movements - both of the gland 
and of the spirits and brain - which represent certain objects to the soul are 
naturally joined with those [movements] which excite certain passions in it 
(soient naturellement joints avec ceux qui exitent en elle certaines passions), 
they can nevertheless by habituation be separated from them and joined with 
other quite different ones ... (I 50/AT XI 369N48) 
Descartes claims that although physiological motions that cause repre-
sentations of certain objects may naturally be joined to other physiological 
motions that excite certain passions in the soul, motions of the first type do 
not inevitably result in those passions. We have the ability to join such 
motions to states distinct from the passions to which they are naturally joined. 
Descartes' picture can be viewed as reflecting two Stoic themes: first, a 
distinction between a passion proper and a mental state which, like a phan-
tasia, precedes it, and second, our capacity to avoid the passion usually 
associated with such a state. That this capacity is a function of the will is 
clear from the discussion that immediately precedes the above passage, for 
there Descartes repeatedly attributes to the will the ability to combat the 
passions (I 48-91 AT XI 366-81V 46-7). 
This conception is embellished in Descartes "general remedy for the pas-
sions" at the close of the treatise (III 211/AT XI 4851V132). Although 
throughout The Passions he maintains that passions are very often good, he 
also calls to mind the Stoic conception of the path€ when he argues that 
passions are bad when they hinder one's capacity for rational action by 
causing certain reasons to seem stronger than they are (III 2111 AT IX 486-
7/V134).35 In an important respect, however, Descartes now more clearly 
diverges from the classical Stoic view: 
... I have included among these remedies the forethought and skill whereby 
we can correct our constitutional deficiencies, in applying ourselves to sepa-
rate within us the movements of the blood and spirits from the thoughts to 
which they are usually joined, I grant that there are few people who are 
sufficiently prepared in this way against all sorts of contingencies, and that 
these movements, excited in the blood by the objects of the Passions, imme-
diately follow so swiftly from mere impressions formed in the brain and from 
the disposition of the organs, even though the soul may in no way contribute 
to them, that there is no human wisdom capable of withstanding them when 
one is insufficiently prepared for them. (III 21llAT XI 486N133-4, emphasis 
mine) 
As we have seen, the Stoics attribute yielding - a presentation's causing an 
impulse without the mediation of the power of assent - to young children 
and animals, but argue that this process is not a feature of (normal) adult 
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human psychology. In this passage, however, Descartes suggests that passions 
can arise independently of any contribution on the part of the soul in human 
beings considered generally. Thus, by contrast with the Stoics, he now seems 
to maintain that a process like yielding may often underlie passions in any 
human being. And hence, he might well deny the Stoic doctrine that normally, 
whenever an adult comes to have a pathos, she must have assented to lekton 
that corresponds to a presentation of that pathos. 
But even if he deviates from Stoicism in this way, he nevertheless reaffirms 
that we always have the power to avoid or (indirectly) to remove a passion 
by an appropriate act of will: 
And those who are strongly inclined by their constitution to the excitations 
of Joy, Pilty, Fear, or Anger cannot keep from fainting, crying, trembling, or 
having their blood all stirred up just as though they had a fever, when their 
fantasy is greatly affected by the object of one of these Passions. But what 
can always be done on such an occasion, and what I think I can set down 
here as the most general remedy for all the excesses of the Passions and the 
easiest to put into practice, is this: when one feels the blood stirred up like 
that, we should take warning, and recall that everything presented to the 
imagination tends to deceive the soul, and to make the reasons for favoring 
the object of its Passion appear to it much stronger than they are, and those 
for opposing it much weaker. (III 211lAT IX 486-7N134) 
At this point Descartes distinguishes two sorts of passion. One motivates the 
agent to a goal the achievement of which requires delay, and the other moti-
vates the agent to a goal that requires immediate action: 
And when the Passion favors only things whose execution admits of some 
delay, one must abstain from making any immediate judgment about them (it 
faut s' abstenir d' en porter sur l'heure aucun jugement), and to distract one-
self by other thoughts until time and rest shall have completely calmed the 
excitation in the blood. Finally, when it incites one to action requiring one 
to reach some resolution at once, the will must be inclined above all to take 
into consideration and to follow the reasons opposed to those the Passion 
represents (que La passion represente), even though they appear less strong. 
As is the case when one is unexpectedly attacked by some enemy, the situ-
ation does not allow one to spend any time deliberating. (III 211/AT XI 
487N134) 
When the blood is agitated by an object of a passion, one can always perform 
certain acts of will which allow the agitation to subside. Significantly, in this 
passage Descartes makes a stronger claim for the power of the will than any 
the Stoics maintained, since he argues that even if the passion is already in 
place one has the power to suspend judgment until it is calmed. 
As did the Stoics, Descartes advocates consulting reason when confronted 
with a passionate attitude towards an object or an inclination towards such a 
passion. For him, the appropriate role of the will in this type of situation is 
to initiate consideration of reasons against having the passionate attitude. 
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Reflection of this sort involves recalling the tendency of the agitation of the 
blood to make reasons for having the passion seem stronger than they are, 
and reasons against seem weaker. Sometimes such deliberation should lead 
us to suspend judgment, so that the agitation in the blood will be calmed. At 
other times, when one does not have the time to allow the agitation to abate, 
the consideration of contrary reasons can permit one to refrain from perform-
ing actions that the passion inclines one to perform.36 Cultivating the habit 
of considering contrary reasons makes such restraint possible. 
In summary, Descartes' theory is similar to its Stoic counterpart in several 
core respects. Like the Stoics, he maintains a distinction between repre-
sentations that precede and incline one towards a passion and the passions 
themselves. Furthermore, in his correspondence with Elisabeth he seems to 
favor the Stoic view that in the typical case, a passion results only when an 
appropriate judgment is made, where a component essential to any judgment 
is the will's assent upon entertaining a preliminary representation. And, al-
though in The Passions a/the Soul Descartes suggests that passions can occur 
without judgment, still he does claim that a passion can always be avoided 
by an act of will. And finally, adopting a position more radical than the 
traditional Stoic view, he argues that even when one is already in the grip of 
a passion, that passion can be eliminated by the voluntary act of suspending 
judgment, whereby it is allowed to subsideY 
III 
In his correspondence with Elisabeth Descartes also develops the second 
Stoic therapeutic strategy for the passions, together with its theological un-
derpinning. In his letter of October 6, 1645, he advances the view that God 
is the cause of every effect: 
.. .it seems to me that all the reasons that prove the existence of God, and that 
he is the first and immutable cause of all the effects that do not depend upon 
the free decision of men, likewise prove in the same way that he is also the 
cause of all those that do depend on it. For one could not demonstrate that 
God exists save by considering him as a being sovereignly perfect; and God 
could not be sovereignly perfect if something could happen in the world that did 
not come entirely from him ... philosophy alone suffices to give us the knowledge 
that the least thought cannot enter the mind of man if God had not wished and 
willed from all eternity that it enter therein. (AT IV 313-4IBI62) 
God is the cause of everything that exists or happens; he is the total cause 
(cause totale) of everything, whether it is something that depends on a free 
decision or whether it is not, and "thus nothing can happen without his will" 
(AT IV 314/B 163). Descartes later indicates to Elisabeth that he believes the 
infinitude of divine power to entail God's being the cause of everything, and 
that in his view, if human actions did not depend on God's will, his power 
would be finite (to Elisabeth, 3 November, 1645, AT IV 332/BI69). 
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In the letter of October 6 Descartes also claims that no change can occur 
in God's decrees on the occasion of some free decision on our part. He then 
points out a consequence of this claim for the proper objective of prayer. We 
should not pray "that we might teach [God] what we have need of, nor that 
we might try to persuade him to change something in the order established 
by his providence from all eternity: both would be blameworthy." Rather, 
"we pray only so that we might obtain what he has wished from all eternity 
to be obtained by our prayers" (AT IV 316/B 163-4). Descartes is recommend-
ing, in effect, that in prayer the perspective we take on our lives should not 
be the one we might ordinarily have, but rather the divine perspective. We 
should pray only for what God has wanted for us from all eternity, and indeed, 
only for what God has wanted for us from all eternity to be obtained by our 
prayers. 
The passage that most dramatically advocates his version of the second 
Stoic strategy occurs in a letter to Chanut, the French ambassador to Sweden. 
Descartes intended this letter to reach Christina, the queen of Sweden, by 
whom he was later employed. In this excerpt, he sets out "the path one ought 
to follow to arrive at the love of God:" 
But if, in addition, we heed the infinity of his power, through which he has 
created so many things, of which we are the least part; the extension of his 
providence that makes him see in one thought alone everything that has been, 
is, shall be, and could be; the infallibility of his decrees (decrets), which, 
although they do not disturb our free will (libre arbitre), nevertheless cannot 
in any fashion be changed; and finally, if, on the one hand, we heed our 
insignifilcance, and if, on the other hand, we heed the grandeur of all created 
things, by noting the manner in which they depend on God and by considering 
them in a fashion that has a relationship to his omnipotence, without confin-
ing them in a globe, as do they who think the world finite: meditation upon 
all this so abundantly fills the man who hears it with such extreme joy that, 
realizing he would have to be abusive and ungrateful toward God to wish to 
occupy God's place, he thinks himself as already having lived sufficiently 
because God has given him the grace to reach such knowledge (it pense deja 
avoir assez vecu de ce que Dieu luy a fait fa grace de parvenir a de telles 
connoissances); and willingly and entirely joining himself to God, he loves 
God so perfectly that he desires nothing more in the world than that God's 
will be done. That is the reason he no longer fears either death, or pains, or 
disgraces, because he knows that nothing can happen to him save what God 
shall have decreed; and he so loves this divine decree, esteems it so just and 
so necessary, knows he ought so entirely to depend upon it, that even when 
he awaits death or some other evil, if per impossibile he could change that 
decree, he would not wish to do so. But if he does not refuse evils or 
afflictions, because they come to him from divine providence, he refuses still 
less all the goods or licit pleasures one can enjoy in this life, because they 
too issue from that providence; and accepting them with joy, without having 
any fear of evils, his love renders him perfectly happy. (to Chanut, 1 February, 
1647, AT IV 608-91B206-7).38 
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In this passage, Descartes advocates abstraction from the personal point of 
view, from the perspective of one's ordinary human aspirations for personal 
survival, happiness, and success, just as Marcus Aurelius does. In Descartes' 
understanding, if our love for God were of the right sort, our identification 
with the divine perspective would be so complete that even if we could, we 
would not refuse our own death or other evils, since they proceed from the 
decree of God. 
In this letter to Chanut, Descartes' picture of how we identify with the 
divine perspective does differ in an important respect from the classical Stoic 
view. One of the most pressing issues for the Stoic therapeutic theory is to 
provide reason and motivation for making this identification. The doctrine of 
reservation and Marcus Aurelius' injunctions suggest that we align ourselves 
with the divine point of view so that we will enjoy equanimity no matter what 
happens, even if what happens conflicts with the good as conceived from the 
personal point of view. One might doubt whether such a reason is sufficient 
to motivate many of us; Thomas Nagel remarks that normally "one is sup-
posed to behold and partake of the glory of God, for example, in a way in 
which chickens do not share in the glory of coq au vin."39 By analogy, imagine 
that one's ruler has a utilitarian concern for the aggregate community which 
is seldom disappointed, but her scheme causes one to be poverty-stricken so 
that many others might be well-off. Trapped in this situation, one might 
consider assuming the sovereign's concerns while abandoning one's personal 
perspective on the good, for the reason that making these psychological 
moves would result in one's achieving equanimity. Very few of us, however, 
are capable of being motivated by this reason in such circumstances. Conse-
quently, for Descartes' version of the second strategy to be feasible, we need 
another proposal for a reason that might motivate us to align ourselves with 
the divine purposes as he conceives them. 
In his letter to Elisabeth of 15 September 1645, Descartes argues that "it 
is necessary to prefer always the interests of the whole, of which one is a 
part, to the interest of one's own person in particular," although "this is to be 
done with measure and discretion." He points out that one is sometimes 
motivated to behave accordingly; "by considering oneself as part of the pub-
lic, one takes pleasure in doing good to everyone," and as a result, one does 
not even fear to risk one's life to save others. Descartes then claims: 
One is naturally led to act from such a consideration when one knows and 
loves God as one ought: for then, abandoning oneself completely to his will, 
one rids oneself of one's particular interest (on se despouille de ces propres 
interests) and has no other passion save to do what one believes to be agree-
able to him; in consequence of which one has satisfaction of mind and 
contentments incomparably more valuable than all the small fleeting joys that 
depend upon the senses. (to Elisabeth, 15 September, 1645, AT IV 294/B 152) 
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Love may be what most commonly provides reason and motivation for other-
regarding actions and attitudes, and perhaps it is therefore plausible for Des-
cartes to advocate love for God as the reason and motivation for identifying 
with the divine point of view.40 
But the love required for the second strategy must be a very powerful sort, 
since it must be capable of causing a person to resign her personal concerns 
to the extent that Descartes envisions. Developing a love of this strength 
would seem unlikely if one were aware that God, despite his capacities, had 
no special regard for one's personal good, and all the more so if one had no 
hope of his attitude ever changing. There are people who on occasion develop 
a self-sacrificing love for someone who, although he could, has no regard for 
the lover's personal good. Sometimes such love arises even toward someone 
who shows no sign of developing such a concern. But we would not want to 
model love for God on such pathological cases. In non-pathological situ-
ations, a love so powerful requires that one believe that the person one loves, 
supposing he is able, has a genuine concern for one's personal good.41 
It is surprising that Descartes does not here advocate the Pauline Christian 
conception by which God's concern is directed toward the good of each 
individual who loves God; "for in all things God works for the good of those 
that love him" (Romans 8:28), and even towards the good of each individual 
"as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive" (I Corinthians 
15:22).42 Rather, just as in Marcus Aurelius's understanding, in the picture 
Descartes advances in his letters to Elisabeth and Chanut the divine concep-
tion of the good need make little concession to the good as conceived from 
any individual's personal perspective. We might draw the following contrast. 
By the Pauline idea, one's personal good is also a concern of God's, and thus, 
although one might have to renounce mistaken conceptions of one's personal 
good in order to assume the divine point of view, one need not disengage 
from any personal conception of one's good whatsoever. According to the 
Stoic and Cartesian picture, one must abandon one's personal conception of 
the good -- one's ordinary human aspirations for survival, happiness, and 
success - and adopt instead the divine vision of the good, which may not 
have such a personal conception as a component. The persistent problem for 
the Stoic and Cartesian view is that we lack a satisfying model by which 
human beings, given their psychological character, will have reason and 
motivation to make the sort of identification it advocates.43 
IV 
The stark compatibilism of this set of Stoic beliefs presents a challenge for 
Descartes, as it did for Chrysippus. If God causes everything, how can we 
have the power to assent, dissent, or suspend judgment upon entertaining a 
presentation? When Elisabeth confronts Descartes with this issue, he re-
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sponds with an illustration.44 Imagine a king who has condemned duelling, 
and who knows that there are two gentlemen in his kingdom who would duel 
if they met. Suppose the king gives each gentleman travelling instructions so 
that the two will assuredly meet on the road. Descartes argues that although 
the king's will (and arrangement of events) results in the gentlemen duelling, 
they still freely do so, and consequently they can justly be punished (AT IV 
352-3/B 174-5). But in this illustration the role of the king is disanalogous 
with the part God plays in the Cartesian universe, where he is the cause of 
every effect, whether it be dependent on human free decisions or not. Thus 
if the king's role were comparable to God's, the king would, in addition, cause 
the gentlemen to be motivated as they are, and if that were so, our intuition 
that the gentlemen act freely would be jeopardized. 
Spinoza believes that a reconciliation between divine determinism and the 
free and voluntary power of assent is impossible, and he therefore denies that 
we have such a power. Noting that by the will he understands "a faculty by 
which the mind affirms or denies something true or something false, and not 
the desire by which the mind wants a thing or avoids it" (111129-130), he 
claims 
IIP48: In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will (In Mente nulla est 
absoluta, sive libera voluntas), but the Mind is determined to will this or that 
by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, 
and so to infinity. (IUI29) 
The crucial element in the proof of this proposition is divine determinism, 
that "all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the 
will or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or infinite 
power" (I Appendix, IIl77). Spinoza later affirms, by way of explanation, that 
"experience itself, no less clearly than reason, teaches that men believe them-
selves to be free because they are conscious of their own actions and ignorant 
of the causes by which they are determined" (IIIP2s, 111143). 
Spinoza also rejects another fundamental element of the first strategy. Ac-
cording to the Stoic and Cartesian view, one's assent, dissent, or suspension 
of judgment is an act distinct from entertaining the proposition to which one 
directs the act of will. This claim is crucial because the first strategy requires 
that one's assent, dissent, or suspension of judgment be subsequent to (and 
thus distinct from) entertaining the proposition that expresses the possibility 
of a passion. Spinoza argues, however, that in general acts of will are not 
distinct from acts of entertaining propositions; "The will and the intellect are 
one and the same," and this is because "the will and the intellect are nothing 
apart from the singular volitions and ideas themselves" and "the singular 
volitions and ideas are one and the same" (IIP49C, IIlI31). In Spinoza's 
understanding, the will and the intellect are identical because every token 
idea is identical to a token volition, and every token volition is identical to 
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a token idea. It turns out that for him the assent that results in a passion would 
not be distinct from one's entertaining the proposition to which the assent is 
granted. 
Spinoza's demonstration of the thesis that there is no distinction between 
token volitions and token ideas assumes the following principle: A and Bare 
token-identical just in case A cannot be conceived without B, and B cannot 
be conceived without A (IIP49d).45 His illustration features the token idea 
that the sum of the measures of the internal angles of a triangle is 180° 
(m= 180°, for short), and token the affirmation that m= 180°. First, Spinoza 
plausibly claims that the token affirmation that m= 180$ cannot be conceived 
without the token idea that m=180°. But then, more controversially, he argues 
that the token idea that m=180° cannot be conceived without the token af-
firmation that m= 180°. One might object to this view on the grounds that in 
general one can entertain an idea without affirming it. Indeed, Spinoza's own 
counterexample expresses this objection: "someone who feigns a winged 
horse does not on that account grant that there is a winged horse; i.e., he is 
not on that account deceived unless he at the same time grants that there is 
a winged horse" (IIP49s, 11/132-3). 
But Spinoza responds by arguing that the absence of affirmation in such 
cases results either from background ideas or from the perception that one's 
idea is inadequate (i.e. lacks some intrinsic qualities of a true idea, such as 
internal consistency) and not from an idea-independent act of will (IID4, 
11/134).46 When one is in possession of one's faculties and imagines a winged 
horse, one also has background ideas that undermine the affirmation-aspect 
of the idea of the winged horse. Nevertheless, there is no voluntary act of 
dissent or suspension of judgment, occasioned by these background ideas, 
and distinct from any idea, that accounts for the absence of affirmation. On 
the contrary, it is explained solely by the causal influence of the background 
ideas themselves. 
Spinoza's response is interesting, but even if his theory is plausible for 
belief, this plausibility does not clearly extend to action and passion. He 
believes it cioes, for he concludes his discussion of the triangle example by 
remarking: ..... what we have said concerning this volition (since we have 
selected it at random), must also be said concerning any volition, viz. that it 
is nothing apart from the idea" (IIP49d, 11/130). Spinoza believes that to will 
an action is to perceive it in a certain way, perhaps as one's best available 
option for action. By this conception, my deciding to eat a piece of pie would 
not be distinct from my entertaining the proposition that eating it is my best 
available course of action. Spinoza illustrates his view by claiming that some-
one "who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such food and drink 
as are equally distant from him ... will perish of hunger and thirst." Presum-
ably Spinoza believes this because the person does not perceive anyone 
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course of action as better than every other (1I/135). Since there is no act of 
will distinct from something's being perceived in a certain way, the person 
will not act in one way rather than the other. 
If Spinoza has shown that we have no free will, and that assenting to a 
proposition is not distinct from entertaining it, then he has undermined the 
foundation for the first therapeutic strategy as the Stoics conceived it. And 
this is precisely what he believes he has done. At the outset of Part V of the 
Ethics, Spinoza reproaches the Stoics for thinking that the affects "depend 
entirely on our will, and that we can command them absolutely" (1I/277), and 
he subsequently criticizes Descartes' similar claim (II1278). 
But if the first Stoic strategy has been undermined, must we abandon any 
hope of controlling our passions? Spinoza thinks not. While the will may not 
be the source of such control, the intellect is: 
Therefore, because the power of the Mind is defined only by the under-
standing (sola intelligentia definitur), as I have shown above, we shall de-
termine by the Mind's knowledge alone (sola Mentis cognitione 
determinabimus) the remedies for the affects. (Il/280) 
Since he maintains that we cannot keep passions from arising by exercise of 
the will, Spinoza looks instead to the intellect for a therapeutic technique.47 
And as I shall now argue, his scheme can be viewed as an attempt to develop 
wholly intellectual analogues for the two main Stoic strategies. 
v 
The Stoics maintain that the power of assent gives us absolute control over 
whether or not we will have palke. Spinoza proposes that the intellect pro-
vides us with a similar kind of absolute control: 
An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a 
clear and distinct idea of it. (Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, 
simulatque ejus ciaram, & distinctam formamus ideam.) (VP3, W282) 
There is no affection of the Body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct 
concept. (Nulla est Corporis affectio, cujus aliquem clarum, distinctum non 
possumus formare conceptum.) (VP4, III282) 
Together, VP3 and VP4 entail that one has the ability to form a clear and 
distinct idea of any of one's passions, thereby eliminating what makes them 
passions.4~ And hence, Spinoza is arguing that not our will, but rather our 
intellect has the power to keep us entirely free from passions. 
To understand the claim of VP3, we must consult Spinoza's definitions of 
terms. Let us first consider 'clear and distinct idea' and 'adequate idea.' At 
IP8s2 Spinoza characterizes a clear and distinct idea as a true idea (1I/50), 
and in IA6 he states that "a true idea must agree with its object" (1I/47). 
Subsequently, he defines an adequate idea as "an idea which, insofar as it is 
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considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or 
intrinsic denominations, of a true idea" (IID4, 11/85). In his explication of 
this definition, Spinoza remarks: "I say intrinsic to exclude what is extrinsic, 
viz. the agreement of the idea with its object." One might conclude that in 
his picture an idea is clear and distinct just in case it has the extrinsic de-
nomination of a true idea, i.e. it agrees with its object, and an idea is adequate 
just in case it has the intrinsic denominations of a true idea, such as internal 
consistency. But for all that, perhaps we need to keep in mind only that each 
of these notions is somehow closely tied to veridicality. For as Bennett argues, 
Spinoza often conflates them, and in fact he appears to do so in the arguments 
we are about to consider.49 
In the summary of the definitions of Part III Spinoza distinguishes actions 
from passions in the following way: 
.. .if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand by 
the Affect an action (tum per Affectum actionem intelligo); otherwise a pas-
sion (alias passionem). (11/139) 
A cause is adequate "whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived 
through it" (IIIDl, 11/139). By contrast, a cause is partial or inadequate "if 
its effect cannot be understood through it alone" (IIIDl, 11/139). Thus an 
affect is an action of Ajust in case it can be clearly and distinctly understood 
(or perceived) through A alone. Correlatively, an affect is a passion of Ajust 
in case it cannot be clearly and distinctly understood through A alone (cf. 
IIID2, 11/139). Spinoza maintains that we have passions in virtue of being 
causally affected by other natural things (IVP2).50 Accordingly, it would seem 
that a passion can be clearly and distinctly understood only through the other 
natural things that contribute to its genesis. 
Given these characterizations, we can now exhibit a difficulty for the claim 
that one has the ability to form a clear and distinct idea of any of one's 
passions, and thereby to eliminate whatever makes it a passion. What Spinoza 
has in mind is that if I clearly and distinctly understand my passion, it will 
be transformed into an action. The definitions of Part III entail that for my 
present passion to become an action, I would have to become the adequate 
cause of a state of which I am not now the adequate cause. And for this to 
occur, I would have to clearly and distinctly understand my passion through 
my nature alone. But this would seem impossible given Spinoza's view that 
we have passions because we are affected by other things in nature. My clear 
and distinct understanding would reveal rather than eliminate the external 
causes of my passion, and hence could not make it any less true that I am 
not the adequate cause of it. As Bennett suggests, the distinction between 
passion and action turns on causal history, and coming to understand the 
causal history of a passion will not change that causal history.51 
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The justification Spinoza cites for the crucial step in the proof of VP3 is 
IIIP3: The actions of a Mind arise from adequate ideas alone; the passions 
depend on inadequate ideas alone. 
a claim which figures prominently throughout Part V. This proposition, by 
Spinoza's account, depends for its justification on 
IIIP}: Our Mind does certain things [acts] and undergoes other things, viz. 
insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, and insofar 
as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things. (11/140) 
In his proof for this last proposition Spinoza assumes that "from any given 
idea some effect must necessarily follow (IP36)." He then claims 
and 
(l) but if God, insofar as he is affected by an idea that is adequate in some-
one's Mind, is the cause of an effect, that same Mind is the effect's adequate 
calise (by IIP}l C) 
if something necessarily follows from an idea that is adequate in God, not 
insofar as he has in himself the Mind of one man only, but insofar as he has 
in himself the Minds of other things together with the Mind of that man, that 
man's Mind (by the same IIPllC) is not its adequate cause, but its partial 
cause. 
Here we encounter Spinoza's fundamental error. In the last analysis, this 
demonstration is the one that is supposed to underwrite the claim that when 
one forms a clear and distinct idea of one's passion, it ceases to be a passion. 
More precisely, if Spinoza's attempt to establish VP3 were to be successful, 
(1) would have to entail 
(2) A person cannot have an adequate (= clear and distinct) idea of a passion, 
that is, a person cannot form a clear and distinct idea of a passion and it 
remain a passion. But (1) provides no support for (2). Even if a Mind is the 
adequate cause of an effect whenever God is the cause of that effect insofar 
as he is affected by an adequate idea in that Mind, it does not follow that a 
Mind is the adequate cause of an effect whenever it simply has an adequate 
idea of that effect. For although it may be impossible for an effect not to be 
wholly caused by an adequate idea in a Mind if God is the cause of that effect 
insofar as he is affected by that adequate idea, it is still possible for an effect 
not to be wholly (or even partially) caused by an adequate idea in a Mind if 
God is not the cause of that effect insofar as he is affected by that adequate 
idea in that Mind. It might be, for example, that an effect of which a Mind 
has an adequate idea is partially caused by the Mind and partially caused by 
natural things external to that Mind. Given Spinoza's view that passions are 
partially externally caused, this is precisely the situation one would expect 
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to obtain when a Mind forms a clear and distinct idea of a passion. Hence, 
Spinoza's reasoning fails to secure VP3.S2 
Although taken together VP3 and 4 suggest that we can actually form clear 
and distinct ideas of any of our passions, and thereby eliminate whatever 
makes them passions, Spinoza's claim in VP4s is more guarded: 
We must, therefore, take special care to know each affect clearly and dis-
tinctly (as far as this is possible), so that in this way the Mind may be 
determined from an affect to thinking those things which it perceives clearly 
and distinctly, and with which it is fully satisfied, so that the affect itself may 
be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true 
thoughts. (II/283, emphasis mine) 
Spinoza now seems to admit that there may be a limit to understanding one's 
affects clearly and distinctly. Furthermore, he appears to be suggesting that 
by forming clear and distinct ideas we separate affects from their external 
causes, rather than eliminating these external causes.53 Perhaps Spinoza's 
view is that if one acquires clear and distinct ideas of one's passions, one's 
attention willI be directed towards one's own causal role in the production of 
these passions, and this, in turn, will result in one's ignoring their external 
causes. But why would such a procedure be therapeutic? 
Stuart Hampshire has suggested that Spinoza's strategy foreshadows Freu-
dian theory.54 But although Spinoza and Freud do share the view that acquir-
ing knowledge of one's affects is therapeutic, we find no analogue in Freud 
to Spinoza's aversion to external causes. I suggest that here Spinoza is at-
tempting to secure a benefit of the first Stoic strategy despite having chal-
lenged its theoretical foundations. An important feature of this first strategy 
is that it encourages us to hold ourselves causally responsible for our pathe 
despite their external triggering causes. Given Stoic psychology, such a stance 
can be reasonable. I can reasonably consider myself causally responsible for 
my pathe, for no matter what the external circumstances, I can keep myself 
from having pathe by dissenting or suspending judgment upon entertaining 
their presentations. But taking this stance can have a benefit that we have not 
yet encountered. The following passage from Epictetus suggests what this 
benefit might be: 
It is not the things themselves that disturb humans, but their judgements 
(dogmata) about these things. For example, death is nothing dreadful, or else 
Socrates too would have thought so, but the judgement that death is dreadful, 
this is th(~ dreadful thing. When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or 
grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves, that is, our own judgments. 
It is the part of an uneducated person to blame others where he himself fares 
ill; to blame himself is the part of one whose education has begun; to blame 
neither another nor his own self is the part of one whose education is com-
plete. (Encheiridion 5, cf. 20) 
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Among the more harmful passions are those that involve absorption in nega-
tive attitudes towards others. Anger and fear might be the principal examples. 
Thinking of oneself as causally responsible for one's anger, however, could 
undermine the inclination to hold an external agent responsible for it, and 
hence might decrease one's tendency to be absorbed in negative attitudes 
towards that agent. Perhaps this type of benefit can be achieved by acquiring 
clear and distinct ideas of one's passions, if, as Spinoza believes, this would 
occasion one's attention to be directed towards one's own part in the produc-
tion of one's passions, which would in turn cause one to disregard their 
external causes. Such a strategy might diminish one's preoccupation with the 
other's causal role, and thereby mitigate the debilitating power of the pas-
sions,ss This, I suggest, is the process Spinoza envisions. 
VI 
In Part V of the Ethics Spinoza also advances a view that has the outline of 
the second Stoic strategy. He claims that "the greatest satisfaction of Mind 
there can be results from having the third kind of knowledge" (VP27), knowl-
edge that "proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the 
adequate knowledge of the essence of things (VP25). To have the third kind 
of knowledge is to understanding things as following from the necessity of 
the divine nature, which is to conceive them sub specie aeternitatis, from the 
point of view of eternity (VP29s). But "the more the Mind understands things 
by the second and third kind of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects 
which are evil, and the less it fears death" (VP38; the second kind of knowl-
edge is "from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of 
the properties of things" (IIP40s2). And thus, identifying with the divine point 
of view (and also acquiring other types of knowledge) provides a form of 
therapy for the passions. 
But just as rejecting the Stoics' theory of the will precludes Spinoza from 
endorsing their version of the first strategy, so disavowing their conception 
of God prevents him from advocating a genuinely Stoic second strategy. The 
crucial feature of Stoic theology he rejects is the view that God acts for the 
sake of ends and concerns (I Appendix, 11/77-83). Spinoza argues that if God 
acted for the sake of an end, he would not be perfect, for he would then want 
something he lacked (11/80). Consequently, Spinoza would also claim that 
since divine providence involves God's acting for the well-being of the uni-
verse (as the Stoics maintain), or for the benefit of human beings, there is no 
divine providence. Thus, identifying with the divine perspective cannot 
amount to evaluating events that occur by the standard of God's purposes, 
because he has none. And furthermore, we cannot be motivated to identify 
with God's point of view by reflecting on divine providence, because there 
is no such thing. 
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As an alternative, Spinoza advocates an intellectualized version for the 
second Stoic strategy, parallel to what he did for the first. Let us briefly 
summarize Spinoza's argument. As we have seen, Spinoza affirms that "the 
greatest satisfaction of Mind th~re can be arises from this third kind of 
knowledge" (VP27, IU297). This is because understanding things by the third 
kind of knowledge is the greatest virtue of the Mind, and therefore "he who 
knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest human perfec-
tion." Spinoza then claims that by his definition of joy - "a man's passage 
from a lesser to a greater perfection" (III Definitions of the Affects II, 111190) 
- it follows that a person who understands things by the third kind of 
knowledge will be affected by the greatest joy, and that given that this joy is 
accompanied by the idea of oneself and one's virtue, this person will expe-
rience the greatest satisfaction of Mind (III Def. Aff. XXV). And because one 
can conceive of oneself through God's essence, i.e. sub specie aeternitatis 
(VP30), one can understand that the joy and satisfaction that issue from 
having the third kind of knowledge are caused by God (VP32). Since love is 
"a joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause" (III Def. Aff. VI), one 
will therefore love God. For the reason that this affect is not love of God 
"insofar as we imagine him to be present, but insofar as we understand him 
to be eternal," Spinoza calls it intellectual love of God (amor intellectus Dei) 
(VP32). 
Further, Spinoza argues that there is something that pertains to the essence 
of the human Mind which is eternal, in the sense that no temporal predicates 
correctly apply to it ("eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any 
relation to time" (VP23s». For there is an idea which expresses the essence 
of the human body sub specie aerernitatis, "with a certain eternal necessity" 
through the essence of God, and because the object of the idea constituting 
the human Mind is the human body (lIP 13), it follows that this idea is 
something eternal which pertains to the essence of Mind (VP23d). Spinoza 
then affirms that the more the Mind knows things by the second and third 
kind of knowledge, the more of it that remains and is eternal (VP38d,s). But 
to the extent that our Mind is eternal it cannot be touched by affects contrary 
to our nature (VP38d). Hence, the more of the Mind that is eternal, the less 
it can be harmed by affects, like harmful passions, whose causal genesis 
involves things external to us. 
As several commentators have persuasively argued, Spinoza's attempt to 
confirm this picture is less than successfu1.56 For example, in addition to the 
problem with the argument for the eternity of some aspect of the human mind, 
one might fault his derivation of love for God from the third kind of knowl-
edge. Even if one acquires joy from the third kind of knowledge (and this is 
not a foregone conclusion - one can imagine acquiring such knowledge as 
a result of classroom coercion and therefore failing to obtain joy), Spinoza's 
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God may seem too impersonal to be a proper subject of love. If we discovered 
that an inanimate machine produced and causally determined the universe, 
coming to know how this machine produced things would not lead us to love 
this machine, even if we deeply enjoyed acquiring this knowledge and we 
realized that our learning itself was caused by the machine. 
Still, Spinoza has a certain vision of our identification with God which can 
be expressed without his rigid formalism. Spinoza, just as the Stoics, is a 
pantheist. In his view, God or Nature (Deus sive Natura) is the only substance, 
and we are modes of God. But although God is eternal, our existence seems 
thoroughly temporally qualified. Our temporality allows us to be vulnerable 
to things that are contrary to our nature, and therefore we can be affected by 
debilitating passions. We can also die. Nevertheless, there may be a respect 
in which we are eternal as God is, and if so, then in this respect we are exempt 
from the harmful passions and from death. Everything that exists foIlows 
from the divine essence. Since by reason we can come to know how things 
follow from the divine essence, reason allows us to identify, in our meta-
phorical sense, with the divine point of view. The intellectual love occasioned 
by this employment of reason can reinforce our identification with the divine 
perspective. But to the extent that we so align ourselves with God, we are 
actually, non-metaphorically, identical with aspects of his essence: 
The Mind's intellectual Love of God is the very Love by which God loves 
himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained by 
the human Mind's essence, considered sub specie aeternitatis; i.e. the Mind's 
intellectual Love of God is part of the infinite Love by which God loves 
himself (VP36, 11/302). 
Spinoza seems here to advocate an intellectualized form of the Neo-Platonic 
vision of mystical union with The One. And in his view, to the extent that we 
are fused with the divine essence, we are eternal, and because it makes no 
sense for something to be contrary to the nature of an eternal entity (VP37, 
VP38d), to the degree we are eternal we are immune from the harmful pas-
sions and from death. 
VII 
Each of the two strategies for psychotherapy, in their original Stoic formula-
tions, has a radical aspect. The first embraces an extreme view about the 
range of our voluntary rational control, while the second prescribes an align-
ment with the divine perspective that is exceptionally difficult to attain. 
Descartes and Spinoza manage these radical features of the Stoic picture in 
different ways. While Descartes endorses them and redevelops the surround-
ing theory, Spinoza rejects them to produce a new conception that neverthe-
less preserves some of the main therapeutic intuitions of the Stoic view. As 
we have now seen, both of these philosophers adhere to a Stoic model despite 
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serious difficulties for their resulting theories, and this attests to the tenacity 
of the Stoic influence on the seventeenth-century European imagination. 
The Stoic view about the passions has an effect on our imagination as well, 
although its force has diminished considerably since the time of Descartes 
and Spinoza. The type of control the Stoics advocated, if employed to relieve 
the relatively minor irritations that plague us, would undoubtedly improve 
our lives. But the Stoics advocated a much more ambitious conception: 
With everything that entertains you, is useful, or of which you are fond, 
remember to say to yourself, beginning with the very least things, "What is 
its nature?" If you are fond of a jug, say, "I am fond of a jug;" for when it 
is broken you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your own child or wife, say 
to yourself that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not 
be disturbed. (Epictetus, Encheiridion 3) 
When the Stoic recommendations are applied to grief upon the death of one's 
child, or to anger that results from serious abuse or torture, the likelihood of 
self-deception and subsequent failure to deal with one's emotions is consid-
erable. This excessive character of Stoic psychotherapy is at times reflected 
in the views of Descartes and Spinoza. If one is tempted by their advice, one 
would do best to proceed with caution.57 
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